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Abstract 
Owing to the changing nature of international conflict, the 1990s witnessed a 
growing need for humanitarian peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. The 
reluctance of the United Nations to be involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa 
compelled South Africa to take part in peacekeeping to assist neighbouring conflict-
ridden states. There is, however, a discrepancy between the conceptualisation and 
application of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This notion is 
manifest in the changing nature of post-Cold War conflicts and requisite strategies, 
doctrines and operational procedures to execute these operations. A shift in South 
African defence policy was necessary to accommodate an expanded mandate to 
make provision for African peacekeeping missions. These humanitarian missions 
unfortunately also have unintended, latent consequences for the host populations, 
which can harm the peace operations as such. 
The aim of this article is to investigate traditional peacekeeping shifting to 
peace-building as a manifest, intended consequence and the way in which 
unintended, latent consequences of peacekeeping come about. 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the changing nature of international 
politics and subsequent conflicts, being mostly intra-state, as well as increasing 
demands for peacekeeping during the 1990s, have put a huge burden on the 
capabilities and resources of not only the United Nations (UN), but also participating 
countries. The unprecedented demand for peacekeepers was complicated by the 
changing role they would have to play. Peacekeepers were not expected to intervene 
in hostile conflicts, which is a non-consensual function for them to fulfil. 
Humanitarian peacekeeping refers to monitoring and protecting of human rights and 
security and the alleviation of human suffering in host countries. It is commonly 




challenges, especially in Africa where the scope and intensity of violence during the 
1990s were great. According to the Special Report on Peacekeeping in Africa the 
continent was plagued by 16 armed conflicts in 1999 alone (Docking 2001:1). Seven 
of these armed conflicts each reflected battle-related deaths of more than a 1 000. 
During 2001 the Brahimi Report, seen as “the most important document on 
peacekeeping ever written” (US Institute for Peace 2001:1), compiled a systematic 
and comprehensive report to identify the technical problems of UN peacekeeping 
missions, as well as those within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) of the UN. It was established that the DPKO was understaffed and the 
administrative budget proved to be insufficient. International political support for the 
growing need for peacekeepers was lacking, as was funding from member states, 
especially the USA. What the Brahimi Report failed to address was the lack of 
political will of member states to contribute to UN peacekeeping. It was found that 
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the most protracted 
war in Africa. Since 1998 this conflict has involved the armed forces of nine 
different states and approximately nine rebel groups (US Institute for Peace 2001:1). 
The UN and Western countries saw this complexity, together with the vast territory 
it covered, as a key reason not to get involved, shifting the burden exclusively onto 
developing countries with limited resources. 
According to Docking (2001:3) the “lack of political will” shown by Western 
countries is the major hindrance of deployment and success of the UN in Africa and 
elsewhere. Western countries are reluctant to participate because few foreign leaders 
will risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood (African) countries where they do 
not have perceived economic or strategic interests. They no longer wish to spend 
billions on costly military interventions each time conflict erupts in Africa. These 
circumstances compel South Africa (SA) to contribute to peacekeeping operations, 
since the notion exists that Africa should look after its own and solve its own 
problems. This would require a broader, expanded policy mandate for the South 
African Defence Force (SANDF) to participate in African peacekeeping operations, 
since SA should also protect itself from the spill-over effects of regional conflicts. 
With conflicts still simmering in countries such as the DRC, Burundi, 
Eritrea/Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan, it is unimaginable that peacekeeping will 
diminish. The long-term effects these conflagrations will have on development on 
the African continent are multi-fold. The peacekeeping missions will inevitably have 
manifest or positive, intended, as well as latent or negative, unintended 
consequences for the host populations of the different conflict-ridden countries 




on a functionalist theoretical perspective, or systems approach, which underlies the 
notion of order and stability in societies. 
The shift in defence policy 
The changing nature of international peace missions began forcing governments 
to reconsider their policies on conflict prevention and participation in peace 
missions.  Some shifts placed a greater emphasis on the development of sub-regional 
organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the African Union (AU) to manage complex peace missions and the increased focus 
on peace-building strategies for war-torn countries (Williams 1999:153). 
Irrespective of the regional emphasis, most countries participating in peace missions 
usually also have national interests for doing so. 
After the first democratic elections in 1994 the new South African Constitution 
(1996), the White Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Review (1998) and the 
White Papers on Intelligence (1995) and on Participation in International Peace 
Missions (1999) were formulated and promulgated. National security was now 
regarded in comprehensive terms to include military, political, economic, social, 
technological and environmental dimensions. Apart from the traditional concerns 
with defence and state, policies were infused with human security principles 
referring to those basic principles and core values associated with and essential to 
the quality of life of people, freedom, justice, prosperity and development for all 
South Africans.  
In the absence of imminent war in the region, a new security environment 
emerged and a redefinition of security became necessary. After 1994 debates on 
peacekeeping developed steadily in SA and major challenges confronted planners of 
future peace operations. Initially SA was wary of participating in peacekeeping, 
because of regional insecurities regarding its hegemonic profile in Africa and not 
wanting to throw its weight around. This political sensitivity and novelty of 
peacekeeping for the South African armed forces served as deterrents to contribute 
forces. Public and private objections to proposals of peacekeeping reflected concerns 
and the notion was that SA would attempt to use its diplomatic and moral muscle to 
resolve crises before committing troops to a conflict area (Williams 1999:156). 
Some of the challenges were to establish the type of force required for 
peacekeeping, the training of such a force and the development of a doctrine for use 
by South African armed forces (Williams 1996:1). 
New policy documents had to be formulated to provide for expanded mandates 
to participate in humanitarian peacekeeping in Africa. The Departments of Foreign 




in Peace Missions in 1997 in the absence of definite guidelines and a well-defined 
mandate for dealing with requests to participate in specific peace missions to 
intervene in a more holistic approach, relating to human security priorities (Kent & 
Malan 2003:1). Peace missions were put within a broad framework with peace-
building as the main focus, emphasising that military participation in peace missions 
is only one tool available to engage in Africa. The challenges to be met were finding 
methods to communicate, resource and implement the good intentions of the White 
Paper promulgated in 1999. Through accepting South Africa’s peace-building role, 
the White paper stressed the partial responsibility for stability in Africa (Cilliers & 
Mills 1999:5). 
A major challenge was to redefine the roles and tasks of the SANDF to 
participate in peacekeeping missions in Africa instead of only fulfilling the 
traditional roles of conventional warfare and protection against external aggression. 
In the new security environment the military had to be reconfigured for a wide 
variety of humanitarian tasks, such as disaster relief and peacekeeping missions. 
However, the Defence Review of 1998 viewed peacekeeping as a secondary 
function and fulfilling secondary roles in the military became a point of dispute and 
ambivalence for professional soldiers who were specifically trained in conventional 
warfare. The feeling was that the SANDF was simply “not prepared, structured and 
trained for law and order tasks” (Pepani 1999:96). Simultaneously, the notion also 
existed that multi-role and skills-based training had become essential, to include 
peacekeeping.  
Ngoma (2004:101) was of the opinion that the balancing of the needs of the 
defence sector with other more humane social needs was important to ensure the 
appropriate utilisation of scarce resources. By taking the expanded roles of human 
security into account to provide education, health services and communication 
networks in remote areas, the defence sector did not have to degrade its primary 
roles by taking on additional secondary roles. The role of the military and security 
services had to be re-examined to establish to what extent the limited resources were 
directed at the necessity to fulfil the secondary roles as well, instead of only the 
primary ones. Pre-deployment training was necessary before any specific 
deployment and was mission-oriented, because it would enhance the execution of 
missions and provided flexibility to change swiftly and easily between missions. The 
military and security services also had to ensure that they remained aligned to their 
primary roles of providing defence and security to the state and its people (Ngoma 
2004:101). Therefore, it became necessary to revise the Defence White Paper (1996) 
and the Defence Review (1998) to include additional secondary roles for members 




participate in international peacekeeping missions. In fact, the Defence Review 
(1998) already stated that:  
“South Africa could contribute ground forces of up to one battalion group 
strength to any particular operation, whilst also ensuring that the SA Army’s 
Rapid Deployment Ground Force and two battalion groups would be prepared 
for participation in peace missions” (Williams 1999:166).  
This regulation, however, would prove to be insufficient because peace missions 
in Africa required many more troops than those it specified. To deploy more troops 
an expanded mandate was needed in the form of an updated Defence White Paper 
and Review (which began in 2003 and is said to be tabled in parliament November 
2009), because political conflict in Africa was not confined within national borders. 
Regional instabilities can easily spill over into SA and have a negative effect on 
non-military development, such as the spreading of disease and movement of 
refugees. 
A shift in defence policy had to accommodate a broader, more inclusive 
mandate and roles for humanitarian peacekeeping operations in African countries 
such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, the DRC, Burundi and Sudan. Missions were to be 
mandated and authorised by the UN, but SA would only participate when it had 
national interests for doing so and when a real threat might cause long-term 
instability in the region. The notion was that domestic peace and stability would not 
be achieved in a context of regional instability where famine, political repression 
and violent conflict and natural disasters were prevalent. Therefore, through 
peacekeeping South Africa wanted to pursue a collective, mutually beneficial 
security environment. This expanded mandate required the White Paper on 
Participation in International Peace Missions (1999), which is a ground-breaking 
document outlining the national interests and philosophy on conflict resolution, to be 
updated. This was necessary to accommodate the need to assign peacekeeping a 
proper place in terms of the roles and functions of the SANDF as a visible element 
of the foreign policy to enable collective security in Africa. This White Paper put 
peace missions within a broad peace-building scenario and reflected South Africa’s 
approach to Africa in general (Cilliers & Mills 1999:5; 156-157). 
The Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs embarked upon updating the 
existing White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions (1999) in 2006 
by providing collaborative inputs from stakeholders in civil society, such as the joint 
Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament, representatives from Foreign 
Affairs, defence and security personnel. This involvement caused Parliament to 
reconsider funding requirements for development and peacekeeping in African 




under way. This revised policy is considered to be a necessity to accommodate 
participation in peace-building and reconstruction efforts in Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, the DRC, Somalia, Rwanda, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan and Cote D’Ivoire (Van der Merwe 2008:2). 
However, according to Williams (1996:60), it is in the challenge of policy 
changes that planners of peace operations ignore the practical “nuts and bolts”. 
These include issues encountered in the field, which can be avoided through 
judicious planning and preparation for anticipated, intended future development. 
These potential problems, also seen as latent, unintended negative consequences, can 
range from macrocosmic to microcosmic levels: 
- At the macrocosmic level peace processes can be hampered by domestic political 
pressure, inadequate policy formulation, absence of political will to participate and 
insufficient international authority supporting the mission, as well as the existence of 
irreconcilable ethnic differences between the belligerents themselves. 
- At the microcosmic level peace operations can fail because of practical factors 
ranging from operational inadequacies to inconsistencies in the rules of engagement, 
poor soldier discipline, poor installation security, inadequate intelligence and 
training, as well as inadequate negotiation skills (Williams 1996:61). 
It is clear that an update of the policy on peace missions must provide for new 
experiences gathered in these missions. According to Kent (2005:85) the 
achievement of military objectives and a secure environment are no longer a 
guarantee for self-sustaining peace. It is rather the re-establishment of the “rule of 
law, good governance, reconciliation, reconstruction and development programmes” 
that is regarded as prerequisites for peace and security. 
Peacekeeping in Africa 
According to Cilliers (1999: 138) the concept of peacekeeping was designed to 
deal with interstate conflict and not with intra-state conflict. It is based on the 
assumption that conflicting states have agreed to international assistance to help 
them live orderly and peacefully and regain stability. However, no major African 
peacekeeping operation was of this nature, since direct conflict between African 
states has been a scarce phenomenon. Almost all African conflicts that needed some 
peacekeeping efforts have been within the borders of specific countries, thus intra-
state. “An important reason for this feature is the permeability of African state 
borders and the weakness of African states themselves” (Cilliers 1999:138).  This 
reason does not detract from the fact that almost all internal conflicts had regional 
aspects, because neighbouring countries have involved themselves in the internal 




actions do take place (e.g. Rwanda and the DRC) because countries are simply 
incapable of controlling their borders. Neither did peacekeeping missions and 
peacekeepers have the consent of the state in conflict, which is usually the case in 
traditional peacekeeping missions. In Africa peacekeepers do not have the relatively 
straightforward task of merely policing agreements between states. They are plunged 
into intractable problems and called upon to recreate collapsing states, intervene in 
vicious civil wars and enforce, if needed, peace settlements (e.g. in Burundi) 
between conflicting parties whose commitment to peace is uncertain (Cilliers 
1999:139). 
According to Ngoma (2005:2) there are three stages of peacekeeping. Firstly, 
when unarmed or lightly armed troops intercede between warring parties it is called 
first-generation peacekeeping. To remain neutral is not easy, especially when one 
side is guilty of brutal human rights abuses. Second-generation peacekeeping 
improves upon the first model by undertaking more complex functions, such as 
policing responsibilities. All belligerents will give comprehensive consent to the 
mission. Support structures will consolidate peace by disarming the warring parties, 
destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation. These pertinent 
requirements for a peaceful environment show the magnitude of the task at hand 
(Ngoma 2005:2). Third-generation peacekeeping is designed to resolve major 
difficulties, such as guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian assistance, 
helping displaced persons and stopping the killing of ordinary citizens by more 
forceful measures. These are followed by peace-enforcement missions to ensure 
forcibly that whatever agreements were reached in prior negotiations will be 
respected. 
“Peace operations” is an all-encompassing term for peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. In this article the focus is specifically on peacekeeping 
operations, which involve “the use of military forces to maintain a negotiated truce 
and facilitate a diplomatic/political resolution to a specific conflict” (Williams 
1996:61). These operations monitor cease-fires, arms control, disengagement and 
demobilisation under the auspices of, for example, the UN or the AU. Peacekeeping 
operations are known by their emphasis on restraint and a self-defensive posture and 
usually presuppose the existence of a cease-fire, while the political objective is of 
the utmost importance. 
In SA it is known that there is a grey area between the conceptualisation and 
application of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This was proven in the 
Burundian case when the use of military force was necessary to secure an end to 




distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations because a 
cease-fire was not yet in existence when peacekeepers were deployed. Therefore 
offensive tactics and weaponry had to be used to accomplish a cease-fire eventually. 
South African peacekeepers had to assist in negotiating a truce and protect 150 VIPs 
who came to Burundi for political negotiations. This positive action on the part of 
SA can be seen as a manifest consequence of peacekeeping in the changing post-
Cold War era.  
Swigert (2004:2) is also of the opinion that the past two decades saw changes in 
peacekeeping, as the normative patrolling of the static cease-fire line is now the 
exception. Peacekeepers are sometimes charged with more responsibilities, to 
protect not only themselves, but also the local communities. The tendency is to 
expect more from (UN) peacekeepers than they are mandated to do. The ultimate 
end of the spectrum of peace operations is to perform challenging tasks, even 
including warfare, for which they are not equipped or trained. A military force 
would be better equipped. In the case of Liberia in 2003 the regional Economic 
Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened. The AU has also 
successfully intervened in peace missions, with the encouragement of the USA in 
the case of Burundi in 2003. The AU has also gone to Darfur in Sudan with troops to 
protect cease-fire monitors.  The willingness of African states, such as South Africa, 
to contribute to peacekeeping in neighbouring war-torn states is commendable. After 
the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 the UN is now willing to reform its 
peace missions to participate with African armed forces to improve their capabilities 
(Swigert 2004:2). 
Although participation in peacekeeping is commendable, it is by nature a costly 
business. The extent of peacekeeping in Africa is not limited only by political will, 
but by the availability of funds as well. The AU experience has been that even a 
relatively small and logistically easy operation undertaken by unarmed observer 
missions was so “costly that it was not able to finance them from its own budget” 
(De Coning 2004:4). South Africa experiences a similar position since the funds for 
peacekeeping have to come from the existing primary role budget, while no extra 
funds are made available for secondary roles. “Lean peacekeeping” will require 
peacekeepers to ”make do” with available resources (Cilliers & Mills 1999:4). At its 
height, the African mission in Burundi is the largest ever undertaken by the AU, 
with 3 335 personnel deployed during 2004. An operational budget of 
US $110 million per year was needed. Such an expense is exorbitant in the African 
sense and will determine the kind of peacekeeping mission the AU is prepared to 




The reality is that African peacekeeping will remain underfunded. Therefore, the 
only viable long-term missions in Africa will be UN peace operations. African peace 
operations will have to be funded by the international community, such as member 
states of the UN and the USA. In the long term AU peacekeeping will only have to 
focus on short-term stabilisation missions such as the one in Liberia, which can be 
undertaken by sub-regional organisations or coalitions such as ECOWAS (De 
Coning 2004:5).  
Some analysts recommend that the regional SADC participates in peacekeeping 
by using the SADC regional standby arrangement for the African Standby Force. 
The development of such a force “is a significant achievement because it provides 
Africa with a common policy framework for peacekeeping capacity building” (De 
Coning 2004:4). It must be deployed as a well-trained, disciplined force for 
peacekeeping operations and can be integrated with other mission participants, 
especially relief and reconstruction missions. In a common SADC peacekeeping 
system South Africa will have to play a major role, considering its hegemonic 
influence. Such a system will benefit from South Africa’s influence, resources and 
peacemaking abilities and initiatives. However, it is possible that it can 
unintentionally become subservient to South Africa’s national interests (De Coning 
2004:7).  
According to Williams (1996:66) it should be acknowledged that the training for 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement differs. Peacekeeping requires training in the 
form of mine or booby-trap handling, patrolling, checkpoint operations, media 
liaison, supervision of cease-fires, maintenance of law and order and the rebuilding 
of infrastructure, which is especially important in Africa. Peace enforcement, on the 
other hand, involves enforcement of UN sanctions, protection of minority rights, 
humanitarian relief efforts, separation and disarming of warring factions and the 
restoration of law and order. Given the experience the SANDF has in internal 
policing operations within South African city suburbs, it has accumulated 
knowledge regarding peace enforcement to apply in future peace operations in 
Africa. SANDF peacekeeping training is mission-specific and makes provision for 
complex, integrated, multifaceted operations aimed at supporting and facilitating 
comprehensive peace agreements. In addition, the focus of peace operations is 
shifting gradually from peacekeeping to peace-building. 
The consequences of interventions related to peacekeeping, peace-building, and 
peace enforcement missions are not always considered in the changing post-Cold 
War era. Manifest intended or positive and latent unintended or negative 
consequences of peacekeeping will have to be considered in the combination of 




peacekeeping systems. The changes in the role and scope of peace operations over 
the last decade exposed a new range of potential unintended consequences for the 
host society as well as for the peace operation itself (Aoi et al 2007:2). 
Intended and unintended consequences of peacekeeping 
Traditional peacekeeping, usually by the UN, was mandated to observe and 
control cease-fire or peace agreements intending to have neutral effects and not to 
have any impact on future directions of the peace process and status quo. 
Peacekeeping has, however, changed in post-Cold War times, having an extended 
focus on peace-building, intending to bring positive changes to the population of the 
host country, which is usually involved in an intra-state conflict and not interstate as 
before. Despite these positive mandates, unintended, negative consequences do 
prevail.  According to Aoi et al (2007:1) the phenomenon of unintended latent 
consequences of peace operations is poorly understood and conceptualised. The 
unintended latent consequences of a rapid external intervention on an already fragile 
host society and economy can weaken the ability of a successful peace operation and 
its intended objectives. The contention is that some unintended consequences can 
harm the very peace operation, since conflicts tend to be prolonged with escalations 
and de-escalations leading to severe casualties and infrastructural damage, which 
needs to be rebuilt during the peace-building efforts (Twum-Danso 2003:2).  
According to Aoi et al (2007:2) “no intervention in a complex system like a 
human society can have only one effect. Complex systems are dynamic and respond 
to interventions in a nonlinear fashion”. Therefore, systems can respond to 
interventions in both an anticipated and unanticipated manner. The latter is called an 
unintended consequence as a natural outcome of a dynamic system. This means that 
despite best efforts to have positive, intended consequences in an intervention, 
negative unintended consequences will also occur. These could also be regarded as 
dysfunctions. Negative, unintended consequences are latent and unexpected because 
they are harmful to the local populations, to the notion of international peace 
interventions as such because their effectiveness is hampered, as well as harmful to 
the organisation that mandates and deploys the peace operations (Aoi et al 2007:3). 
There are also some unintended consequences far beyond specific peace operations, 
e.g. violence, sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers of those they are 
supposed to protect. These negative consequences have undermined the credibility 
of the UN, the Secretary-General and peace operations as an international conflict 
management tool (Aoi et al 2007:4). 
However, the fact that unintended latent consequences occur does not render 
futile the mandating, planning and managing of peace processes. Unintended 




catered for in planning and managing. The fact that these consequences do not 
receive much attention could be ascribed to the preoccupation of planners and 
practitioners with reaching intended consequences of peace operations, e.g. 
rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, protecting human rights and alleviating 
suffering. When measuring the success of peace operations, the mandates they were 
tasked with are explicitly focussed upon. Peace operations are expected to ensure 
positive outcomes such as promoting stability and durable peace, as well as 
rebuilding and developing host populations to uphold democracy and human rights 
(Aoi et al 2007:4). 
Peace operations may, however, fail to deliver the intended good results, as 
unintended negative incidents are caused by a few “bad apples” who, for example, 
act outside the norm by committing atrocities such as rape and sexual abuses, which 
are regarded as part of the non-linear and dynamic behaviour of complex systems 
and a systemic consequence of peace operations (Aoi et al 2007:5). However, 
peacekeepers are still expected to abide by the laws and customs of the host society. 
They should be duty-bound, professional and support human rights to the benefit of 
the host populations and the mission itself (Kent 2005:86). 
Aoi et al (2007:6) refer to examples of unintended consequences such as sexual 
abuse and violence, gender abuse, distortions of the local economy, impact on host 
systems, on humanitarian activities, on civil-military coordination, on troop-
contributing countries, and the legal position of the UN and institutional response to 
unintended consequences by the UN and others. This article grouped major findings 
of unintended consequences under the topics: permissive environment, impact on 
local economy, impact on local civil service, change in gender roles and impact on 
troop-contributing countries. These latent unintended, negative consequences are 
discussed below: 
Permissive environment refers to the breakdown of law and order, socio-
economic infrastructure and socio-cultural norms. Post-conflict situations, in which 
most peace operations operate, can create fertile ground for unintended 
consequences to occur. Natural checks and balances are usually absent. The absence 
of these systems affords little protection to civilians against violence and sexual 
abuse (Kent 2005:86). According to Aoi et al (2007:6) it is often a conscious 
strategy to demoralise the opposing population in a conflict by committing gender 
and sexual violence against them. There is the problem that such violence can be 
institutionalised in post-conflict states when conditions remain favourable for 
violence to occur. Jordan (2004:1) reports that while humanitarian interventions 




prostitution and sexual abuse. This is referred to as the darker side of peacekeeping 
and nation-building.  
Kent (2005:87) refers to extreme poverty, lack of economic activity and 
opportunity and the loss of family members and community support networks as 
conditions accounting for the vulnerability of girls and women to sexual abuse by 
local men, as well as international peacekeepers, in exchange for food, money and 
shelter. These acts damage the credibility of the specific mission and are also 
conducive to human trafficking. However, the fact that humanitarian workers and 
peacekeepers are perpetrators of sexual abuse and violence is not a new concept and 
its gravity cannot be ignored (Kent 2005:87). Peacekeeping operations are also 
remembered for the children conceived and left behind. These babies and mothers 
are left without support or provision for the future. Despite clear codes of conduct by 
the UN, these abuses continue without fear of punishment by the perpetrators as a 
result of limited remedial action. According to Jordan (2004:1) it is “outrageous that 
the very same people who are there to protect these women and girls are using their 
position and exploiting them instead – and they are getting away with it”. Sexual 
violence is regarded with a pervasive air of impunity. Violence against women is 
generally not prosecuted in the peacekeeper’s homeland and certainly not in a 
chaotic post-conflict zone (Jordan 2004:3). 
The impact of the local economy: The deployment of thousands of peacekeepers, 
police and humanitarian aid civilians has various effects on the host society. These 
people distort the local economy by establishing a dual economy – one for the 
peacekeepers and another for the local population. The degree of poverty of the local 
population will determine the level of impact the peacekeepers will have upon the 
host society.  The negative effects can be an increase in salary disparities and 
unequal living standards, as well as exploitation of all kinds, while the positive 
impacts can be job creation for the local communities by increasing a demand for 
certain commodities used by the international peacekeepers. This economic 
stimulation is only temporary and cannot be sustained, since the deployment is 
temporary. However, it could give a false sense of relief to the local population (Aoi 
et al 2007:7; Jordan 2004:1). 
Impact on the local civil service: The dual economic system has an effect on the 
host public sector in the sense that it not only has a negative effect, but also builds 
the capacity of the public sector and supports the extension of state control in the 
host state. Another unintended consequence can be that the inflow of considerable 





Change in gender roles: In many societies the positions of woman are 
traditionally subordinate to those of men. They are subjected to gender-based 
discrimination at home as well as in public and with little control over their own 
sexuality some trade themselves for food, money and shelter (Kent 2005:87). 
Notwithstanding, one of the intended consequences of peace-building programmes 
is the empowerment of women to play a bigger role in society. There are, however, 
also negative latent effects of women’s empowerment, since it invites resentment 
from their families and society because of their newly gained independence (Aoi et 
al 2007:9). This can lead to domestic violence in very traditional, cultural societies. 
It can also lead to role shifting in families by mothers to grandmothers and even to 
older children where woman assume self-confident and independent roles instead of 
being subordinate to a patriarchal society. 
The impact on troop-contributing countries: Contributions to peace missions 
give rise to opportunities as well as financial, social and political costs, which again 
lead to unintended consequences. There is a conception that developing countries 
contribute troops to peacekeeping since it is a financial opportunity for both the 
country or the military institution and the individual troops. It is also known that 
corruption and manipulation occurred in the appointment of high positions to earn 
higher salaries. In addition, funds coming from the UN to reimburse countries for 
peacekeeping are sometimes misappropriated (Aoi et al 2007:9).  
Participation in peacekeeping is not without danger, even when peacekeepers are 
to be respected for their neutral and impartial status. In August 2006, for example, 
two AU peacekeepers were killed in the Darfur region of Sudan by rebel groups. 
This caused an international outcry against a violation of international law (Jooma 
2006:1). This incident relates to the issue of rules of engagement. According to 
Williams (1996:66) rules of engagement can also cause unintended consequences. 
These rules are necessary to both the political and operational success of an 
operation, but indiscriminate or uneven application of force can alienate the host 
population. It can also lead to attacks on peacekeepers by belligerents. Acts such as 
these will be a political embarrassment for the troop-contributing country and 
discredit the peace operation itself. 
The issue of integrating unintended consequences into the planning and 
management of peace operations requires accountability. Authority and the issue of 
accountability are important elements and refer to the control of the mission. This 
control relates to the management of behaviour of individuals and covers unintended 
consequences such as sexual exploitation and abuse, corruption and theft in UN 
peace operations, which are not initially anticipated or expected. It is usually seen as 




identify the problem. Therefore, unintended consequences have to be included in the 
planning of a peace operation as part of the natural feedback cycle of complex 
systems (Aoi et al 2007:10). This will improve the overall effectiveness of the 
operation. However, since the system is dynamic, it will still be difficult to 
anticipate all latent unintended consequences to ensure accountability throughout the 
mission by significantly reducing obvious negative consequences. 
Negative effects can be monitored and have to be detected at the earliest 
opportunity. According to Aoi et al (2007:12) managing unintended consequences in 
peace operations requires purposefully interacting with the system “with the aim of 
continuously adjusting our actions to the feedback generated by the system with a 
view to minimising any negative unintended consequences our interventions may 
have caused”. In containing and managing unintended consequences, the focus is 
thus on the system feedback through institutionalised monitoring and evaluating 
mechanisms by constantly adjusting programmes or initiating new actions. The goal 
is to improve the mechanisms and it must be remembered that the misconduct of a 
few should not undermine the contributions of many (Kent 2005: 91). 
According to Aoi et al (2007:14) models of accountability refer to two separate 
potential mechanisms, the delegation and participatory models. Firstly, power is 
delegated to specific individuals or institutions, making them accountable to those 
who delegate the power to them, e.g. when the UN reports to the member states and 
the UN Security Council. Secondly, in the participatory model those in power are 
accountable to individuals in the polity, e.g. the UN’s actions are made accountable 
to the host population in peacekeeping operations. It would be ideal if a peace 
operation could establish a balance between these two models of accountability in 
order to develop meaningful accountability towards and by the host population. The 
host population constitutes the institutions and civil society and in post-conflict 
situations these official institutions will undergo considerable change to ensure 
broad representation of popular will and opinion. 
Control over missions rests ultimately with the legal authority of the troop-
contributing state, in this case South Africa. It has to control criminal and 
disciplinary issues concerning troops. The contributing country is responsible for 
upholding international law and human rights, as well as ensuring that criminal and 
disciplinary accountability are controlled. 
Apart from attending to unintended consequences encountered in peacekeeping 
missions, some of the major challenges facing the Department of Defence and the 
SANDF are to reconsider the issue of the primary function in line with secondary 
functions, to balance the decreasing budget with the requirements of peacekeeping, 




integrate newly acquired weapon systems of the Strategic Defence Package into the 
force design to ensure eventual collective security in Africa (Le Roux 2005:264).  
 
Conclusion 
With (or without) the necessary policy documents in place, South Africa seems 
to be coping with the challenges of humanitarian peacekeeping and peace-building 
in Africa. Its role in peace missions is regarded as invaluable, since ending conflicts 
is an important goal of South Africa’s foreign policy to prevent the spill-over of 
conflict into South Africa itself. Unfortunately, unintended consequences of peace 
missions are a definite part of dynamic complex systems, and will occur most of the 
time. 
“Post-conflict environments offer the opportunity to address economic, political 
and social marginalisation by ensuring institutions and legislations are reconstructed 
in a non-discriminatory manner” (Kent 2005:91). There is unfortunately a time lag 
between the implementation of the agenda and reaping the rewards thereof. Until the 
rule of law is established and institutions are in place to assist them, the host 
population remains vulnerable and unintended consequences could occur. It is thus 
easy for prostitution and child abuse to flourish in mission areas, also called 
permissive environments, in the absence of other economic opportunities for women 
and girls. This problem gets worse as a result of gender discrimination and unequal 
power dynamics. Poverty, starvation and previous exposure to violence encourage 
women to trade sexual favours for material gain in order to survive. 
Troop-contributing countries, such as South Africa, will have to shape the 
environment by reaching intended goals through restoring peace and building new 
infrastructure to alleviate human suffering and pursue sustainable social 
development. The UN and the AU will have to bring to justice perpetrators of abuse; 
however difficult it may be, they must be held accountable for their actions. The 
misconduct of a few can jeopardise the peace mission itself and this must be 
prevented by timely planning and management of troops. It is important that the 
services intended to benefit the host populations do not become tools of exploitation 
(Kent 2005:87). However, it must always be kept in mind that the peacekeepers are 
faced with real challenges, such as keeping an uneasy peace, often having 
ambiguous mandates and being away from their families for months with limited 
leave and recreational facilities. 
The purpose of the work by Aoi et al (2007) was to contribute to the 
improvements of peace operations. The notion was that the aspect of unintended 




manifest positive or latent negative or even neutral. Negative unintended 
consequences are most harmful to the host societies that peace operations are 
intended to benefit. The focus was explicitly on how unintended consequences come 
about and how ways to counteract such potential negative circumstances can be 
improved. To enhance understanding of unintended consequences of peace 
operations a culture of accountability should be instituted and anticipate unintended 
consequences as part of all planning cycles to eventually monitor, prevent and 
manage negative side-effects of humanitarian peace operations. However, to learn 
lessons from both failures and successes to undertake better peace operations in the 
long term does not contribute much if the original short term conflict resolution was 
not well-defined and accomplished, eg. the 1993 Somali case, which led to even 
more unintended consequences and loss of lives of 18 US Army Rangers in the 
streets of Mogadishu. The contention is to prevent side-effects and if there is no 
peace to keep like in Somalia, peacekeepers should not be there at all. 
It is clear that unintended consequences are important to understand and can be 
regarded as a neglected topic in peacekeeping missions. Some are morally and 
ethically unacceptable and can impede upon the mission’s capacity to achieve its 
mandate. The value of peace operations can be questioned and the troop-
contributing countries and institutions such as the UN and AU can be brought into 
disrepute, while some negative consequences are major incentives for reform and 
greater accountability within international institutions.  
Unintended, negative consequences are therefore regarded as natural 
consequences of the dynamic nature of complex systems. It is important to recognise 
and anticipate these consequences in order to make provision to prevent, contain and 
manage them proactively through institutional mechanisms on a daily basis to build 
eventual peace in war-torn African countries. Without order and stability there will 
only be conflict, poverty and no development and growth in Africa. 
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